THESES ON FEUERBACH
Theses of Feuerbach
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach
included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in
the form of the _object or of contemplation_, but not as _sensuous human
activity, practice_, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to
materialism, the _active_ side was developed abstractly by idealism --
which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought
objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as _objective_
activity. Hence, in "Das Wesen des Christenthums", he regards the
theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while
practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical
manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of
"revolutionary", of "practical-critical", activity.
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking
is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove
the truth -- i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his
thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of
thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely _scholastic_
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is
essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must,
therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity
or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as
Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, of the
duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His
work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis.
But that the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes
itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by
the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular basis. The
latter must, therefore, in itself be both understood in its
contradiction and revolutionized in practice. Thus, for instance, after
the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family,
the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice.
Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants contemplation;
but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But
the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is
1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the
religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an
abstract -- isolated -- human individual.
2. Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as "genus", as an
internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many
Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the "religious sentiment" is
itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he
analyses belongs to a particular form of society.
All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead
theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and
in the comprehension of this practice.
The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is,
materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical
activity, is contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.
The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint
of the new is human society, or social humanity.
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the
point is to change it.
Return to Hanover College
Return to History Department