Aristotle, Politics, 340BC

Households, villages, and states
{1}Every state is as we see a sort of partnership, and every partnership is formed with a view to some good （since all the actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they think to be good). It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good, the partnership that is the most supreme of all and includes all the others does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the partnership entitled the state, the political association. Those then who think that the natures of the statesman, the royal ruler, the head of an estate and the master of a family are the same, are mistaken. （They imagine that the difference between these various forms of authority is one of greater and smaller numbers, not a difference in the kind -- that is, that the ruler over a few people is a master, over more the head of an estate, over more still a statesman or royal ruler, as if there were no difference between a large household and a small city. . . ; but these views are not true.） . . . .

{2}In this subject as in others the best method of investigation is to study things in the process of development from the beginning. The first coupling together of persons, then, to which necessity gives rise is that between those who are unable to exist without one another: for instance, the union of female and male for the continuance of the species. （And this not of deliberate purpose; but with man as with the other animals and with plants, there is a natural instinct to desire to leave behind one another being of the same sort as oneself.） [Another instance is] . . . the union of natural ruler and natural subject for the sake of security. （ . . . He that can foresee with his mind is naturally ruler and naturally master, and he that can do these things with his body is subject and naturally a slave; so that master and slave have the same interest.) Thus the female and the slave are by nature distinct . . . . Yet among barbarians the female and the slave have the same rank; and the cause of this is that barbarians have no class of natural rulers, but with them the conjugal partnership is a partnership of female slave and male slave. Hence the saying of the poets -- "'Tis meet that Greeks should rule barbarians" -- implying that barbarian and slave are the same in nature. From these two partnerships then is first composed the household, and Hesiod was right when he wrote -- "First and foremost a house and a wife and an ox for the ploughing" -- for the ox serves instead of a servant for the poor. The partnership therefore that comes about in the course of nature for everyday purposes is the "house," the persons whom Charondas speaks of as "meal-tub-fellows" and the Cretan Epimenides as "manger-fellows."

{3}On the other hand, the primary partnership made up of several households for the satisfaction of not mere daily needs is the village. The village according to the most natural account seems to [consist of colonies] from a household, formed of those whom some people speak of as "fellow-sucklings," sons and sons' sons. It is owing to this that our cities were at first under royal sway and that foreign races are so still, because they were made up of parts that were under royal rule; for every household is under the royal rule of its eldest member, so that the colonies from the household were so too, because of the kinship of their members. . . .

{4}The partnership finally composed of several villages is the city-state; it has at last attained the limit of virtually complete self-sufficiency, and thus, while it comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the good life. Hence every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other partnerships. . . . From these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal. And a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (like the "clanless, lawless, hearthless" man reviled by Homer, for one by nature unsocial is also 'a lover of war') inasmuch as he is solitary, like an isolated piece at draughts. And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another). But speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state.

{5}Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually. For the whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal sense . . . because a hand in those circumstances will be a hand spoiled. . . . It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole. . . .

{6}Therefore the impulse to form a partnership of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first united people in such a partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice. For unrighteousness is most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of virtue, man is the most unholy and savage of animals, and the worst in regard to sexual indulgence and gluttony. Justice on the other hand is an element of the state; for judicial procedure, which means the decision of what is just, is the regulation of the political partnership.

Household management
{7}And now that it is clear what are the component parts of the state, we have first of all to discuss household management; for every state is composed of households. Household management falls into departments corresponding to the parts of which the household in its turn is composed; and the household in its perfect form consists of slaves and freemen. The investigation of everything should begin with its smallest parts, and the primary and smallest parts of the household are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. . . . There is also a department which some people consider the same as household management and others the most important part of it, and the true position of which we shall have to consider: I mean what is called the art of getting wealth.

{8}Let us begin by discussing the relation of master and slave. . . . [Some argue that slavery] is unjust, for it is based on force. Since therefore property is a part of a household and the art of acquiring property a part of household management （for without the necessaries even life, as well as the good life, is impossible, . . . the manager of a household must have his tools, and of tools some are lifeless and others living. An article of property is a tool for the purpose of life, and property generally is a collection of tools, and a slave is a live article of property. But we must next consider whether or not anyone exists who is by nature of this character, and whether it is advantageous and just for anyone to be a slave, or whether on the contrary all slavery is against nature. And it is not difficult either to discern the answer by theory or to learn it empirically. Authority and subordination are conditions not only inevitable but also expedient; in some cases things are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or to be ruled. . . .

{9}As between the sexes, the male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the male ruler and the female subject. And the same must also necessarily apply in the case of mankind as a whole; . . . [for] those whose function is the use of the body and from whom this is the best that is forthcoming . . .are by nature slaves, for whom to be governed by this kind of authority is advantageous. . . . For he is by nature a slave who is capable of belonging to another (and that is why he does so belong). . . . The usefulness of slaves diverges little from that of animals; bodily service for the necessities of life is forthcoming from both, from slaves and from domestic animals alike. . . .

{10}And even from these considerations it is clear that the authority of a master over slaves is not the same as the authority of a magistrate in a republic, nor are all forms of government the same, as some assert. Republican government controls men who are by nature free, the master's authority [controls] men who are by nature slaves; and the government of a household is monarchy since every house is governed by a single ruler, whereas statesmanship is the government of men free and equal. . . .

{11}As we saw, the science of household management has three divisions, one the relation of master to slave, of which we have spoken before, one the paternal relation, and the third the conjugal for it is a part of the household science to rule over wife and children (over both as over freemen, yet not with the same mode of government, but over the wife to exercise republican government and over the children monarchical); for the male is by nature better fitted to command than the female (except in some cases where their union has been formed contrary to nature) and the older and fully developed person than the younger and immature. It is true that in most cases of republican government the ruler and the ruled interchange in turn (for they tend to be on in equal level in their nature and to have no difference at all), . . . but the male stands in this relationship to the female continuously. The rule of the father over the children on the other hand is that of a king; for the male parent is the ruler in virtue both of affection and of seniority, which is characteristic of royal government. . . .

Characteristics of household members
{12}Does a slave possess any other excellence, besides his merits as a tool and a servant. . . , or has he no excellence beside his bodily service? For either way there is difficulty; if slaves do possess moral virtue, wherein will they differ from freemen? or if they do not, this is strange, as they are human beings and participate in reason. And nearly the same is the question also raised about the woman and the child: have they too virtues, and ought a woman to be temperate, brave and just, and can a child be intemperate or temperate, or not? This point therefore requires general consideration in relation to natural ruler and subject: is virtue the same for ruler and ruled, or different? . . . . It is evident therefore that both must possess virtue, but that there are differences in their virtue (as also there are differences between those who are by nature ruled). And of this we straightway find an indication in connection with the soul; for the soul by nature contains a part that rules and a part that is ruled, to which we assign different virtues, that is, the virtue of the rational and that of the irrational. It is clear then that the case is the same also with the other instances of ruler and ruled. Hence there are by nature various classes of rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the male the female, and the man the child in a different way. . . .

{13}All possess the various parts of the soul, but possess them in different ways; for the slave has not got the deliberative part at all, and the female has it, but without full authority, while the child has it, but in an undeveloped form. Hence the ruler must possess intellectual virtue in completeness. . .; while each of the other parties must have that share of this virtue which is appropriate to them. We must suppose therefore that the same necessarily holds good of the moral virtues: all must partake of them, but not in the same way, but in such measure as is proper to each in relation to his own function. Hence it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a moral virtue of their own, and that the temperance of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor their courage and justice, as Socrates thought, but the one is the courage of command, and the other that of subordination, and the case is similar with the other virtues. . . . Hence we must hold that all of these persons have their appropriate virtues, as the poet said of woman: "Silence gives grace to woman" though that is not the case likewise with a man. Also the child is not completely developed, so that manifestly his virtue also is not personal to himself, but relative to the fully developed being, that is, the person in authority over him. And similarly the slave's virtue also is in relation to the master.

{14}For since every household is part of a state, and these relationships are part of the household, and the excellence of the part must have regard to that of the whole, it is necessary that the education both of the children and of the women should be carried on with a regard to the form of the constitution, if it makes any difference as regards the goodness of the state for the children and the women to be good. And it must necessarily make a difference; for the women are a half of the free population, and the children grow up to be the partners in the government of the state.

Citizenship
{15}For the student of government, and of nature and characteristics of the various forms of constitution, almost the first question to consider is in regard to the state: what exactly is the essential nature of a state? . . . But a state is a composite thing, in the same sense as any other of the things that are wholes but consist of many parts; it is therefore clear that we must first inquire into the nature of a citizen; for a state is a collection of citizens, so that we have to consider who is entitled to the name of citizen. . . .

{16}What constitutes a citizen is therefore clear from these considerations: we now declare that one who has the right to participate in deliberative or judicial office is a citizen of the state in which he has that right, and a state is a collection of such persons sufficiently numerous, speaking broadly, to secure independence of life. But in practice citizenship is limited to the child of citizens on both sides, not on one side only, that is, the child of a citizen father or of a citizen mother. . . .

{17}But one of the difficulties as to what constitutes a citizen is still left. Is it truly the case that a citizen is a person who has the right to share office in the government, or are the working classes also to be counted citizens? If these persons also are to be counted who have no share in offices, it is not possible for every citizen to possess the citizen's virtue; for the true citizen is the man capable of governing. . . . For it is true that not all the persons indispensable for the existence of a state are to be deemed citizens, since even the sons of citizens are not citizens in the same sense as the adults: the latter are citizens in the full sense, the former only by presumption -- they are citizens, but incomplete ones. In ancient times in fact the artisan class in some states consisted of slaves or aliens, owing to which the great mass of artisans are so even now; and the best-ordered state will not make an artisan a citizen. . . . As there are several forms of constitution, it follows that there are several kinds of citizen, and especially of the citizen in a subject position. . . .

Forms of government
18}Now it has been said in our first discourses, in which we determined the principles concerning household management and the control of slaves, that man is by nature a political animal; and so even when men have no need of assistance from each other they none the less desire to live together. . . . [Households include varieties of government.] The authority of a master over a slave, although in truth when both master and slave are designed by nature for their positions their interests are the same, nevertheless governs in the greater degree with a view to the interest of the master, but incidentally with a view to that of the slave, for if the slave deteriorates the position of the master cannot be saved from injury. Authority over children and wife . . . is exercised either in the interest of those ruled or for some common interest of both parties . . . .

{19}But inasmuch as "constitution" means the same as "government," and the government is the supreme power in the state, and this must be either a single ruler or a few or the mass of the citizens, in cases when the one or the few or the many govern with an eye to the common interest, these constitutions must necessarily be right ones, while those administered with an eye to the private interest of either the one or the few or the multitude are deviations. For either we must not say that those who are part of the state are citizens, or those who are part of the state must share in the advantage of membership. Our customary designation for a monarchy that aims at the common advantage is "kingship"; for a government of more than one yet only a few "aristocracy" (either because the best men rule or because they rule with a view to what is best for the state and for its members); while when the multitude govern the state with a view to the common advantage, it is called by the name common to all the forms of constitution, "constitutional government." . . .

{20} Deviations from the constitutions mentioned are tyranny corresponding to kingship, oligarchy to aristocracy, and democracy to constitutional government; for tyranny is monarchy ruling in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government in the interest of the rich, democracy government in the interest of the poor, and none of these forms governs with regard to the profit of the community.

{21}But what is the best constitution and what is the best mode of life for most cities and most of mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of a virtue that is above the level of private citizens or of an education that needs natural gifts and means supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the ideal constitution, but of a mode of life able to be shared by most men and a constitution possible for most states to attain?

{22}In all states therefore there exist three divisions of the state, the very rich, the very poor, and thirdly those who are between the two. Since then it is admitted that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is manifest that the middle amount of all of the good things of fortune is the best amount to possess. For this degree of wealth is the readiest to obey reason, whereas for a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite -- exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station, it is difficult to follow the bidding of reason; for the former turn more to insolence and grand wickedness, and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wickedness, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either insolence or malice. And moreover the middle class are the least inclined to shun office and to covet office, and both these tendencies are injurious to states. And in addition to these points, those who have an excess of fortune's goods, strength, wealth, friends and the like, are not willing to be governed and do not know how to be （and they have acquired this quality even in their boyhood from their homelife, which was so luxurious that they have not got used to submitting to authority even in school), while those who are excessively in need of these things are too humble. Hence the latter class do not know how to govern but know how to submit to government of a servile kind, while the former class do not know how to submit to any government, and only know how to govern in the manner of a master. The result is a state consisting of slaves and masters, not of free men, and of one class envious and another contemptuous of their fellows. . . . Because of this it was a good prayer of Phocylides -- "In many things the middle have the best; Be mine a middle station."

{23}It is clear therefore also that the political community administered by the middle class is the best, and that it is possible for those states to be well governed that are of the kind in which the middle class is numerous, and preferably stronger than both the other two classes, or at all events than one of them, for by throwing in its weight it sways the balance and prevents the opposite extremes from coming into existence. Hence it is the greatest good fortune if the men that have political power possess a moderate and sufficient substance, since where some own a very great deal of property and others none there comes about either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy, or a tyranny may result from both of the two extremes, for tyranny springs from both democracy and oligarchy of the most unbridled kind, but much less often from the middle forms of constitution and those near to them.

Book 6

Liberty

{24}Now a fundamental principle of the democratic form of constitution is liberty -- that is what is usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate in liberty, for they assert this as the aim of every democracy. . . . The popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute justice. . . . [Thus] in democracies, the poor are more powerful than the rich, because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority is sovereign. This then is one mark of liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a . . . slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim not to be governed, preferably not by anybody. . . .

{25}[For the] . . . kind of democracy [in which] all the population share in the government, it is not within the power of every state to endure, and it is not easy for it to persist . . . . With a view to setting up this kind of democracy and making the people powerful, their leaders usually acquire as many supporters as possible and admit to citizenship not only the legitimate children of citizens but also the base-born and those of citizen-birth on one side (I mean those whose father or mother is a citizen), for all this element is specially congenial to a to democracy of this sort. Popular leaders . . . ought however only to go on adding citizens up to the point where the multitude outnumbers the notables and the middle class and not to go beyond that point; for if they exceed it they make the government more disorderly, and also provoke the notables further in the direction of being reluctant to endure the democracy. . . . Moreover the characteristics of a tyranny also are all thought to be democratic, I mean for instance licence among slaves, which may really be advantageous for the popular party up to a point, and among women and children, and indulgence to live as one likes. A constitution of this sort will have a large number of supporters, as disorderly living is pleasanter to the mass of mankind than sober living. But it is not the greatest or only task of the legislator or of those who desire to construct a constitution of this kind merely to set it up, but rather to ensure its preservation; for it is not difficult for any form of constitution to last for one or two or three days. We must therefore . . . carefully avoid the things that cause destruction, and enact such laws both written and unwritten as shall best [preserve the state] . . . , and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time.