Joseph Stalin,
Speech on Agrarian Policy
Dec. 27, 1929
Excerpted from the Original Electronic Text at "From Marx to Mao."
Food shortages were a serious problem in the early days of the Soviet Union, and in 1921 Lenin instituted the New Economic Plan (NEP) as a means of improving agricultural production. The NEP allowed peasants to farm for profit. A few (5% or so) became prosperous in the following decade. However the kulaks (prosperous farmers) were dissatisfied, in part because there were no manufactured goods available for them to buy with the profits of their farms. Sometimes they refused to sell their crops as a form of political protest. As illustrated by the speech excerpted below, Stalin blamed them for food shortages and ordered the collectivization of their farms. In theory only the kulaks were to be targeted, but in practice the government took over the farms belonging to any peasants who opposed collectivization. Angry farmers slaughtered their livestock and wrecked their farm machinery rather than turn them over to the state. A virtual civil war developed between the Russian military and the peasants, and by 1931 millions of peasants had died. -smv
N.B. Stalin cites grain statistics in terms of the Russian pood, which is about 36
pounds.
{1} The characteristic feature in the work of our Party during the past year is that we, as a Party, as the Soviet power:
a) have developed an offensive along the whole front against the capitalist elements in the countryside;
b) that this offensive, as you know, has yielded and continues to yield very appreciable, positive results.
{2} What does this mean? It means that we have passed from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. It means that we have carried out, and are continuing to carry out, one of the decisive turns in our whole policy.
{3} Until recently the Party adhered to the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks. As you know, this policy was proclaimed as far back as the Eighth Party Congress. It was again announced at the time of the introduction of NEP and at the Eleventh Congress of our Party. We all remember Lenin's well-known letter [in 1922 in which he] . . . once again returned to the need for pursuing this policy. Finally, this policy was confirmed by the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. And it was this policy that we were pursuing until recently.
{4} Was this policy correct? Yes, it was absolutely correct at the time. Could we have undertaken such an offensive against the kulaks some five years or three years ago? Could we then have counted on success in such an offensive? No, we could not. That would have been the most dangerous adventurism. It would have been a vcry dangerous playing at an offensive. For we should certainly have failed, and our failure would have strengthened the position of the kulaks. Why? Because we did not yet have in the countryside strongpoints in the form of a wide network of state farms and collective farms which could be the basis for a determined offensive against the kulaks. Because a. that time we were not yet able to replace the capitalist production of the kulaks by the socialist production of the collective farms and state farms. . . .
{5} An offensive against the kulaks is a serious matter. It should not be confused with declamations against the kulaks. Nor should it be confused with a policy of pinpricks against the kulaks, which the . . . opposition did its utmost to impose upon the Party. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must smash the kulaks, eliminate them as a class. Unless we set ourselves these aims, an offensive would be mere declamation, pinpricks, phrase-mongering, anything but a real Bolshevik offensive. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must prepare for it and then strike at the kulaks, strike so hard as to prevent them from rising to their feet again. That is what we Bolsheviks call a real offensive. Could we have undertaken such an offensive some five years or three years ago with any prospect of success? No, we could not.
{6} Indeed, in 1927 the kulaks produced over 600 million poods of grain, about 130 million poods of which they marketed outside the rural districts. That was a rather serious power, which had to be reckoned with. How much did our collective farms and state farms produce at that time? About 80 million poods, of which about 35 million poods were sent to the market (marketable grain). Judge for yourselves, could we at that time have replaced the kulak output and kulak marketable grain by the output and marketable grain of our collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not.
{7} What would it have meant to launch a determined offensive agains. the kulaks under such conditions? It would have meant certain failure, strengthening the position of the kulaks and being left without grain. That is why we could not and should not have undertaken a determined offensive against the kulaks at that time. . .
{8} But today? What is the position now? Today, we have an adequate material base for us to strike at the kulaks, to break their resistance, to eliminate them as a class, and to replace their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. You know that in 1929 the grain produced on the collective farms and state farms amounts to not less than 400 million poods (200 million poods below the gross output of the kulak farms in 1927). You also know that in 1929 the collective farms and state farms have supplied more than 130 million poods of marketable grain (i.e., more than the kulaks did in 1927). Lastly, you know that in 1930 the gross grain output of the collective farms and state farms will amount to not less than 900 million poods (i.e., more than the gross output of the kulaks in 1927), and their output of marketable grain will be not less than 400 million poods (i.e., incomparably more than the kulaks supplied in 1927).
{9} That is how matters stand with us now, comrades.
{10} There you have the change that has taken place in the economy of our country.
{11} Now, as you see, we have the material base which enables us to replace the kulak output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. It is for this very reason that our determined offensive against the kulaks is now meeting with undeniable success.
{12} That is how an offensive against the kulaks must be carried on, if we mean a genuine and determined offensive and not mere futile declamations against the kulaks.
{13} That is why we have recently passed from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class.
{14} Well, and what about the policy of dekulakization? Can we permit dekulakization in the areas of complete collectivization? This question is asked in various quarters. A ridiculous question! We could not permit dekulakization as long as we were pursuing the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, as long as we were unable to go over to a determined offensive against the kulaks, as long as we were unable to replace the kulak output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. At that time the policy of not permitting dekulakization was necessary and correct. But now? Now things are different. Now we are able to carry on a determined offensive against the kulaks, break their resistance, eliminate them as a class and replace their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. Now, dekulakization is being carried out by the masses of poor and middle peasants themselves, who are putting complete collectivization into practice. Now, dekulakization in the areas of complete collectivization is no longer just an administrative measure. Now, it is an integral part of the formation and development of the collective farms. Consequently it is now ridiculous and foolish to discourse at length on dekulakization. When the head is off, one does not mourn for the hair.
{15} There is another question which seems no less ridiculous: whether the kulaks should be permitted to join the collective farms. Of course not, for they are sworn enemies of the collective-farm movement.