Ibid. 183 E. Feeling ashamed before Melissos and the rest who assert that the all is one being, for fear we should examine the matter somewhat crudely, I am even more ashamed in view of the fact that Parmenides is one of them. Parmenides seems to me, in the words of Homer, a man to be reverenced and at the same time feared. For when I was a mere youth and he a very old man, I conversed with him, and he seemed to me to have an exceedingly wonderful depth of mind. I fear lest we may not understand what he said, and that we may fail still more to understand his thoughts in saying it; and, what is most important, I fear lest the question before us should fail to receive due consideration. . . .
Soph. 238 c (concluding a discussion of Parmenides). You understand then that it is really impossible to speak of not-being or to say anything about it or to conceive it by itself, but it is inconceivable, not to be spoken of or mentioned, and irrational.
Parm. 150 B. Accordingly the unity itself in relation to itself is as follows : Having in itself neither greatness nor littleness, -it could not be exceeded by itself nor could it exceed itself, but being equal it would be equal to itself.
(104 ) Ibid. 163 c. This statement: It does not exist, means absolutely that it does not exist anywhere in any way, nor does not-being have any share at all in being. Accordingly not-being could not exist, nor in any other way could it have a share in being.
(Symp. 178 iB, 195 c : Reference to the stories which Hesiod and Parmenides told about the gods. Line 132 is quoted.)
Arist. Phys. i. 2; 184 b 16. The first principle must be one, unmoved, as Parmenides and Melissos say, . . .
Ibid. i. 3 ; 186 a 4. To those proceeding after this impossible manner things seem to be one, and it is not difficult to refute them from their own statements. For both of them reason in a fallacious manner, both Parmenides and Melissos; for they make false assumptions, and at the same time their course of reasoning is not logical. . . . And the same sort of arguments are used by Parmenides, although he has some others of his own, and the refutation consists in showing both that he makes mistakes of fact and that he does not draw his conclusions correctly. He makes a mistake in assuming that being is to be spoken of absolutely, speaking of it thus many times; and he draws the false conclusion that, in case only whites are considered, white meaning one thing, none the less there are many whites and not one; since neither in the succession of things nor, in the argument will whiteness be one. For what is predicated of white will not be the same as what is predicated of the object which is white, and nothing except white will be separated from the object; since there is no other ground of separation except the fact that the white is different from the object in which the white exists. But Parmenides had not yet arrived at the knowledge of this.
Ibid. i. 5 ; 188 a 20. Parmenides also makes heat (105) and cold first principles; and he calls them fire and earth.
Ibid. iii. 6 ; 207 a 15. Wherefore we must regard Parmenides as a more acute thinker than Melissos, for the latter says that the infinite is the all, but the former asserts that the all is limited, equally distant from the centre [on every side].
Gen. Corr. i. 3 ; 318 b 6. Parmenides says that the two exist, both being and not being-i.e. earth and water.
Metaph. i. 3 ; 984 b 1. None of those who have affirmed that the all is one have, it happens, seen the nature of such a cause clearly, except, perhaps, Parmenides, and he in so far as he sometimes asserts that there is not one cause alone, but two causes.
Metaph.i.5; 986 b l8. For Parmenides seemed to lay hold of a unity according to reason, and Melissos according to matter; wherefore the former says it is limited, the latter that it is unlimited. - Xenophanes first taught the unity of things (Parmenides is said to have been his pupil), but he did not make anything clear, nor did he seem to get at the nature of either finiteness or infinity, but, looking up into the broad heavens, he said, the unity is god. These, as we said, are to be dismissed from the present investigation, two of them entirely as being somewhat more crude, Xenophanes and Melissos; but Parmenides seems to speak in some places with greater care. For believing that not-being does not exist in addition to being, of necessity he thinks that being is one and that there is nothing else. . . . and being compelled to account for phenomena, and assuming that things are one from the standpoint of reason, plural from the standpoint of sense, he again asserts that there are two causes and two first principles, heat and (106) cold, or, as he calls them, fire and earth ; of these he regards heat as being, its opposite as not-being.
Metaph. ii. 4; 1001 a 32. There is nothing different from being, so that it is necessary to agree with the reasoning of Parmenides that all things are one, and that this is being.
Theophrastos, Fr. 6a; Laer. Diog. ix. 21, 22; Dox. 482. Parmenides, son of Pyres, the Eleatic, was a pupil of Xenophanes, yet he did not accept his doctrines. . . . He was the first to declare that the earth is spheroidal and situated in the middle of the universe. He said that there are two elements, fire and earth; the one has the office of demiurge, the other that of matter. Men first arose from mud ; heat and cold are the elements of which all things are composed. He holds that intelligence and life are the same, as Theophrastos records in his book on physics, where he put down the opinions of almost everybody. He said that philosophy has a twofold office, to understand both the truth and also what (107) men believe. Accordingly- he says: (Vv. 28-30)) 'Tis necessary for thee to learn all things, both the abiding essence of persuasive truth and men's opinions in which rests no true belief.'
Theoph, Fr. 17 ; Diog. Laer. viii. 48 ; Dox. 492. Theophrastos says that Parmenides was the first to call the heavens a universe and the earth spheroidal.
Theoph. de Sens. 3 ; Dox. 499. Parmenides does not make any definite statements as to sensation, except that knowledge is in proportion to the excess of one of the two elements. Intelligence varies as the heat or the cold is in excess, and it is better and purer by reason of heat; but nevertheless it has need of a certain symmetry. (Vv. 146-149) 'For,' he says, 'as at any time is the blending of very complex members in a man, so is the mind in men constituted; for that which thinks is the same in all men and in every man, viz., the essence of the members of the body; and the element that is in excess is thought.' He says that perceiving and thinking are the same thing, and that remembering and forgetting come from these6 as the result of mixture, but he does not say definitely whether, if they enter into the mixture in equal quantities, thought will arise or not, nor what the disposition should be. But it is evident that he believes sensation to take place by the presence of some quality in contrast with its opposite, where he says that a corpse does not perceive light and heat and sound by reason of the absence of fire, but that it perceives cold and silence and the similar contrasted qualities, and in general that being as a whole has a certain knowledge. So in his statements he seems to do away with what is difficult by leaving it out.
Theophr. Fr. 7 ; Simpl. Phys. 25 r 11 5 ; Dox. 483. In (108) the first book of his physics Theophrastos gives as the opinion of Parmenides: That which is outside of being is not-being, not-being is nothing, accordingly being is one.
Hipp. Phil. 11 ; Dox. 564. Parmenides supposes that the all is one and eternal, and without beginning and spheroidal in form; but even he does not escape the opinion of the many, for he speaks of fire and earth as first principles of the all, of earth as matter, and of fire as agent and cause, and he says that the earth will come to an end, but in what way he does not say. He says that the all is eternal, and not generated, and spherical, and homogeneous, not having place in itself, and unmoved, and limited.
Plut. Strom. 5; Dox. 580. Parmenides the Eleatic, the companion of Xenophanes, both laid claim to his opinions, and at the same time took the opposite standpoint. For he declared the all to be eternal and immovable according to the real state of the case; for it is alone, existing alone, immovable and without beginning (v. 60) ; but there is a generation of the things that seem to be according to false opinion, and he excepts sense perceptions from the truth. He says that if anything exists besides being, this is not-being, but not-being does not exist at all. So there is left the being that has no beginning; and he says that the earth was formed by the precipitation of dense air.
Epiph. adv. Haer. iii. 10; Dox. 590. Parmenides, the son of Pyres, himself also of the Eleatic school, said that the first principle of all things is the infinite.
Cie. de Nat. Deor. i. 11 ; Dox. 534. For Parmenides devised a sort of contrivance like a crown (he applied to it the word GREEK), an orb of light with continuous heat, which arched the sky, and this he called (109) god, but in it no one could suspect a divine form or a divine sentiment, and he made many monstrosities of this sort; moreover, he raised to the rank of gods War, Discord, Desire, and many other things which disease or sleep or forgetfulness or old age destroys; and Similarly with reference to the stars he expresses opinions which have been criticized elsewhere and are omitted here.
Aet. i. 3; Dox. 284. Parmenides, the Eleatic, son of Pyrrhes, was a companion of Xenophanes, and in his first book the doctrines agree with those of his master; for here that verse occurs: (V. 60), Universal, existing alone, immovable and without beginning. He said that the cause of all things is not earth alone, as his master said, but also fire. 7; 303. The world is immovable and limited, and spheroidal in form. 24; 320. Parmenides and Melissos did away with generation and destruction, because they thought that the all is unmoved. 25; 321. All things are controlled by necessity; this is fated, it is justice and forethought, and the producer of the world.
Aet. ii. 1 ; Dox. 827. The world is one. 4; 332. It is without beginning and eternal and indestructible. 7; 335. Parmenides taught that there were crowns encircling one another in close succession,8 one of rarefied matter, another of dense, and between these other mixed crowns of light and darkness; and that which surrounded all was solid like a wall, and under this was a crown of fire; and the centre of all the crowns was solid, and around it was a circle of fire; and of the mixed crowns the one nearest the centre was the source of motion and generation for all, and this 'the goddess who directs the helm and holds the keys,'9 he calls 'justice and necessity.' The air is that which is separated from the earth, being evaporated by the (110) forcible pressure of the earth; the sun and the circle of the milky way are the exhalation of fire, and the moon is the mixture of both, namely of air and fire. The aether stands highest of all and surrounding all, and beneath this is ranged the fiery element which we call the heavens, and beneath this are the things of earth. 11 ; 339. The revolving vault highest above the earth is the heavens. 340. The heavens are of a fiery nature. 13 ; 342. The stars are masses of fire. 15 ; 345. He ranks the morning star, which he considers the same as the evening star, first in the aether; and after this the sun, and beneath this the stars in the fiery vault which he calls the heavens. 17; 346. Stars are fed from the exhalations of the earth. 20 ; 349. The sun is of a fiery nature. The sun and the moon are separated from the milky way, the one from the thinner mixture, which is hot, the other from the denser, which is cold. 25; 356. The moon is of a fiery nature. 26; 357. The moon is of the same size as the sun, and derives its light, from it. 30; 361. (The moon appears dark) because darkness is mingled with its fiery nature, whence he calls it the star that shines with a false light.
Aet. iii. 1 ; 365. The mixture of dense and thin gives its milk-like appearance to the milky way. 11; 377.. Parmenides first defined the inhabited parts of the earth by the two tropical zones. - 15 ; 380. Because the earth is equally distant on all sides from other bodies, and so, rests in an equilibrium, not having any reason for swaying one way rather than another; on this account it only shakes and does not move from its place.
Aet. iv. 3; 388. The soul is of a fiery nature.. 5 ; 391. The reason is in the whole breast. 392. Life and intelligence are the same thing, nor could there be any living being entirely without reason. 9; 397. Sensations arise part by part according to the symmetry of (111) the pores, each particular object of sense being adapted to each sense (organ). 398. Desire is produced by lack of nourishment.
Aet. v. 7; 419. Parmenides holds the opposite opinion; males are produced in the northern part, for this shares the greater density; and females in the southern part by reason of its rarefied state. 420. Some descend from the right side to the right parts of the womb, others from the left to the left parts of the womb; but if they cross in the descent females are born. 11; 422. When the child comes from the right side of the womb, it resembles the father ; when it comes from the left side, the mother. 30 ; 443. Old age attends the failure of heat.