George Rogers Clark, The Conquest of the Illinois, 1778-1779

Excerpts from George Rogers Clark, The Conquest of the Illinois, edited by Milo Milton Quaife (Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1920)

[21] The whole of my time when not thus employed was devoted to reflecting upon things in general; particularly whether or no it accorded with the interest of the United States to support Kentucky. . . . This has influenced my conduct throughout the course of the war, and enabled me better to judge the importance of Kentucky to the Union, situated as it was almost in the midst of the Indians, who had commonly engaged in the Kentucky war as an impediment in their to the more interior frontiers. I saw that as soon as they should accomplish the destruction of Kentucky they would descend upon our frontiers; and instead of the states receiving supplies from thence, they would be obliged to keep large bodies of troops for their defense. It would be almost impossible to

[22] move an army at so great a distance to attack their towns, even if they could be found. . . .

[34] Every preparation was now made for our departure. After spending a day of amusement we parted with our friends from Kentucky, they to return to the defense of the country and we in search of new adventures. On the twenty-fourth of June, 1778, we left our little island and running about a mile up the river in order to gain the main channel, we shot the Falls [of the Ohio] at the very moment the sun was under a great eclipse, which caused various conjectures on the part of the superstitious among us.

[35] Knowing that spies were watching the river below the Illinois towns, I had planned to march part of the way by land. I therefore left behind all of our baggage except enough to equip the men after the Indian fashion. Our entire forces, after leaving behind those who were judged unequal to the expected fatigues of the march, consisted of but four companies, under Captains Montgomery, Bowman, Helm, and Harrod. . . .

[40] On the evening of July fourth we arrived within a few miles of the town [of Kaskaskia], where we threw our scouts in advance and lay until dark. We then resumed our march and took possession of a house on the bank of the Kaskaskia River, about three-quarters of a mile above the town, occupied by a large family. We learned from the inmates that the people had been under arms a few days before but had concluded the alarm to be groundless and at present all was quiet, and that there was a large number of men in town. Although Indians were for the most part absent. We obtained from the

[41] man boats enough to convey us across the river, where I formed my force in three divisions. I felt confident the inhabitants could not now obtain knowledge of our approach in time to enable them to make any resistance. My object was now to get possession of the place with as little confusion as possible, but to have it if necessary at the loss of the whole town. . .

These arrangements produced the desired effect, and within a very short time we were in complete possession of the place, with every avenue guarded to prevent any one from escaping and giving the alarm to the other villages. . .

[50] I ordered Major Bowman to mount his company and part of another on horses to be procured from the town, and taking with him a few townsmen to inform their friends of what had happened, to proceed without delay to Cahokia and if possible gain possession of the place before the following morning. I gave him no further instructions on the subject, leaving him free to exercise his own judgment. He gave orders for collecting the horses, whereupon a number of gentlemen came to inform me that they were aware of the design. They pointed out that the soldiers were much fatigued, and said they hoped I would not reject their offer to execute whatever I might wish to have done at Cahokia. The people there were their friends and relatives and would, they thought, follow their example. At least, they hoped, they might be permitted to accompany the detachment.

Conceiving that it might be good policy to show them that we put confidence in them (which, in fact, I desired for obvious reasons

[51] to do), I told them I had no doubt Major Bowman would welcome their company and that as many as chose might go.

They appeared to be highly pleased at this idea, and in the evening the Major set out with a force but little inferior to the one with which we had entered the country, the Frenchmen being commanded by their former militia officers. . . . It was night before the part moved and the distance being twenty leagues, it was late in the morning of the sixth before they reached Cahokia. Detaining every person they met, they entered the outskirts of the town before they were discovered. The townsmen were at first much alarmed by this sudden appearance of strangers in hostile array and being ordered even by their friends and

[52] relatives to surrender the town. As the confusion among the women and children over the cry of the Big Knives being in town proved greater than had been anticipated, the Frenchmen immediately informed the people what had happened at Kaskaskia. Major Bowman told them not to be alarmed; that although resistance was out of the question he would convince them that he would prefer their friendship to their hostility. He was authorized to inform them that they were at liberty to become free Americans as their friends at Kaskaskia had done. Any who did not care to adopt this course were free to leave the country except such as had been engaged in inciting the Indians to war.

Cries of liberty and freedom, and huzzahs for the Americans rang through the whole town. The gentlemen from Kaskaskia dispersed among their friends and in a few hours all was amicably arranged, and Major Bowman snugly quartered in the old British fort. . .

[59]Everything in this section now wore a promising appearance, but Vincennes was never absent from my mind. I had reason to suspect from some things I had learned, that Mr. Gibault, the priest, had been inclined to the American interest previous to our arrival in the country. I had no doubt of his fidelity to us. Knowing he had great influence over the people, and that Vincennes was also under his jurisdiction, I sent for him and had a long conference on that subject. In response to my questions he stated that he did not think it worth my while to cause any military preparation to be made at the Falls for an attack on

[60] Vincennes although the place was strong and there was a great number of Indians in the neighborhood. . . . He thought that when the inhabitants should be fully informed of what had happened at the Illinois and the present happiness of their friends there, and should be fully acquainted with the nature of the war, their sentiments concerning it would undergo a great change. He was certain that his appearance there would have great weight even among the savages. If it were agreeable to me, he would take this matter upon himself, and he had no doubt of being able to bring the place over to the American interest without my being put to the trouble of marching troops against it. . . .

[61] . . . Mr. Gibault and party arrived safely, and after spending a day or two in explaining matters to the people they universally acceded to the proposal
[62] (except for a few Europeans who had been left there by Mr. Abbott and who immediately left the country) and went in a body to the church, where the oath of allegiance was administered to them in the most solemn manner. A commander was elected and the fort was immediately taken possession of and the American flag displayed, to the great astonishment of the Indians. . .

[Clark's negotiations with Native Americans in the Illinois Country were successful, but he soon feared his efforts would be undone when he learned that Lieutenant-Governor Henry Hamilton, known as the "hair-buying general," had marched British troops from Detroit and had captured Vincennes in December 1778. Hamilton decided to remain at Vincennes until Spring. In early February 1779, Clark's men left for Vincennes, but "the weather was wet and a part of the country was covered with several inches of water." They struggled across the countryside but keep their spirits up. In one instance, "a comical little drummer had afforded them great diversion by floating on his drum and other tricks and they really began to regard themselves as persons whom neither floods nor seasons could stop" (119)]]

[125]During most of this march the weather was warm and moist for the season. This was the coldest night we had and in the morning the ice was one-half or three-fourths of an inch deep in still water and close to shore. The morning was the finest we had had on our entire march. Shortly after sunrise I addressed the men. What I said to them I do not now remember, but it may be easily imagined by anyone who can understand my affection for them at that time. I concluded by informing them that by surmounting the plain, now in full view, and reaching the woods opposite they would put

[126] an end to their suffering and in a few hours would have sight of their long-wished-for goal. Without waiting for any reply I stepped into the water and a hurrah was raised. We commonly marched through the water in single file as it was much easier to advance in this way. When about a third of the men had entered I halted them and further to prove the men, and because I had some suspicion of three or four of them, I called to Major Bowman to fall into the rear with twenty-five men and to put to death any of the men who refused to march, saying that we wished to have no such person among us. The whole force raised a cry of approbation and on we went. This was the most trying difficulty of all we had experienced. . . . To encourage the party I sent some of the strongest men ahead with orders to pass the word back when they reached a certain distance that the water was getting shallower, and on

[127] approaching the woods to cry out "Land." This stratagem produced the desired effect. Encouraged by it the men exerted themselves to the limit of their ability, the weaker holding on to the stronger ones and frequently one man being upheld by two. This was a great advantage to the weak, but the water, instead of getting shallower, became continually deeper. On reaching the woods, where they expected land, the water was up to my shoulders. Nevertheless, gaining these woods was a matter of great importance. . . . The strong and tall men got ashore and started fires. Many would reach the bank and fall with their bodies half in the water, not being able to support themselves outside it. This was a delightful spot of dry ground about ten acres in extent. We soon found, however, that the fires did us no good and that the only way to restore the men was for two strong ones to take a weak one by the arms and exercise him. The day was delightful and by this means they soon recovered. . .

[129] Our situation was now sufficiently critical. We were within full view of a town which contained upwards of six hundred men, counting soldiers, inhabitants, and Indians, with no possibility of retreat open to us in case of defeat. . .

[132] We advanced slowly in full view of the town, but as it was a matter of some consequence to make ourselves appear as formidable as possible, on leaving our place of concealment we marched and countermarched in a fashion calculated to magnify our numbers. Every person who had undertaken to enroll volunteers in the Illinois had been presented with a stand of colors and these, ten or twelve in number, they had brought along with them. We now

[133] displayed these to the best possible advantage, and since the plain through which we were marching was not perfectly level but was dotted with elevations rising seven or eight feet above the common level and running in an oblique direction to our line of march towards the town, we took advantage of one of these to march our men along the low ground so that only the colors (which had been fixed to long poles procured for the purpose) could be seen above the height. . . . The firing now commenced against the fort, but since drunken Indians often saluted it after nightfall, the garrison did not suppose it to be from an enemy until one of

[134] the men, lighting his match, was shot down through a porthole. The drums now sounded and the conflict was fairly joined on both sides. . .

[136]The garrison was now completely surrounded and the firing continued without intermission (except for about fifteen minutes shortly before dawn) until nine o'clock the following morning. . .

[137]Since we could not afford to lose any of our men, great pains were taken to keep them sufficiently sheltered and to maintain a hot fire against the fort in order to intimidate the enemy

[138] as well as to destroy them. The embrasures for their cannon were frequently closed, for our riflemen finding the true direction would pour in such volleys when they were open that the artillerymen could not stand to the guns. . .

[142] Thus the attack continued until nine o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fourth.

[143] Towards evening a flag of truce . . .

We met at the church about eighty yards from the fort, Governor Hamilton, Major

[145] Hay, superintendent of Indian Affairs, Captain Helm, who was his prisoner, Major Bowman, and myself, and the conference began. Governor Hamilton produced articles of capitulation containing various provisions, one of which was that the garrison should be surrendered on being permitted to go to Pensacola on parole. After deliberating on every article I rejected the whole proposal. Hamilton then desired me to make some proposition. I told him I had no offer to make other than I had already done, that they surrender themselves as prisoners unconditionally. . .